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I. CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Sports have always been an integral part of American society. We have always 
had a special place for them in our hearts and minds. Whether debating which player is 
the best in a sport or which team will win the championship, there is always something 
that stirs us to fanaticism and hysteria when it comes to watching or playing the games 
that have become so important in our lives. While it may be the homerun, slam dunk, or 
touchdown that we view as the essential part of sports, it is really the behind the scenes 
acts of the players and owners that dictate what we watch live or on television. This 
behind the scenes action is encompassed by the act of collective bargaining, which has 
existed in sports since the beginning but did not take on a name until the middle of the 
20th century. Collective bargaining in sports is the process by which owners in the 
professional sports leagues negotiate with the players in their league on every issue that 
affects the sport. The collective bargaining process is one that has a long and contentious 
history in each sport, because at its core it is the process that seeks to take power away 
from one group and give to the other and vice versa. The very nature of it calls for debate, 
disagreement and discontent.  
In this paper I will look at how the three major sports leagues, the NBA, MLB, 
and NFL have used the collective bargaining process to create the working conditions 
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that now exist and allow each league to be successful. I will look at the history of the 
collective bargaining process in each sport and how that process evolved to create the 
collective bargaining agreements that exist today. After looking at the history of each 
sport’s bargaining procedures, I will look at the major concepts developed within the 
collective bargaining process and compare these major concepts amongst the three 
sporting leagues.  
This analysis comes at an appropriate time given that the collective bargaining 
agreements in all three sports are set to expire after the 2010-2011 seasons. This paper 
will serve as an introduction to the principles that will arouse the most debate such as free 
agency, salary caps, and revenue sharing. I hope that this paper will diligently outline the 
major issues apparent in the recent collective bargaining agreements, provide a historical 
analysis of them and offer a reasonable solution for the problems that arise from these 
issues. 
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II. CHAPTER 2. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
History 
As with most professional sports organizations, basketball began as a sport that was 
largely unregulated by governing bodies. Without the precedent of labor unions, or 
government involvement the two major basketball associations (the Basketball 
Association of America and the National Basketball League) were completely controlled 
by the franchises within each organization and their owners. The beginning of the 
player’s union movement came in 1954, when Bob Cousy began to organize the NBPA 
(National Basketball Players Association) by writing to an established player from each 
of the league’s teams in hopes of encouraging solidarity among the players.1From 1946 
tio 1949 players used the two opposing leagues as leverage to ensure that their salary 
demands were being met. This meant that if a player did not receive the salary that they 
felt their play dictated they would just switch leagues depending on whether a team in 
either league would pay them the money they felt they deserved.  
In 1949 the two leagues merged to form the National Basketball Association. “The 
merger left players with two options: play for the salary the NBA offered you or play 
Amateur Athletic Union basketball for a company team, the latter was an option that a 
                                                 
1Robert Bradley, “Labor Pains Nothing New To The NBA,” The Association for Professional Basketball 
Research http://www.apbr.org/labor.html (accessed October 1, 2010). 
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few top players chose including Clyde Lovellette, Jim Pollard and George Yardley.”2 
1954 initiated the beginning of the first players union by writing to the top players from 
every team in the league. Cousy wrote to: Paul Arizin of Philadelphia, Carl Braun of New 
York, Bob Davies of Rochester, Paul Hoffman of Baltimore, Andy Phillip of Fort 
Wayne, Dolph Shayes of Syracuse and Don Sunderlage of Milwaukee. Cousy also went 
to NBA president Maurice Podoloff at the January 1955 NBA All-Star game with a list of 
concerns for the player’s rights. After Cousy’s efforts were rebuffed by the league and 
the owners and his list of concerns were denied, Cousy met with the AFL-CIO over 
possible union affiliation. After this meeting the NBA agreed to bargain in good faith 
with the players union and the NBA Board of Governors formally recognized the NBPA 
and agreed to a list of terms which included: A seven dollar per diem and other 
reasonable traveling expenses; An increase in the 1957-58 playoff pool; Regular players 
would no longer be able be required to report to training camp earlier than four weeks 
prior to the season; The elimination of exhibition games within three days of the season 
opener or one day prior to a regular season game; Paler contracts would be mailed no 
later than September 1st; referral of player-owner disputes to the NBA league president or 
a committee of three NBA governors to be chosen by the player; Considerate treatment 
for the player in regards to radio and television appearances; And reasonable moving 
expenses for a player traded during the season. 
The next large step taken by the players union in negotiating with the league was the 
adoption of a pension plan for retired NBA players. Negotiations over the pension plan 
stalled until the 1964 NBA All Star game, when players threatened to sit out of the All 
                                                 
2
 Ibid  
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Star game unless the league made some sort of guarantee that there would be a pension 
plan following that season. In May of 1964 the league instituted a policy where the 
owners would contribute 50% toward the purchase of a $2,000 endowment 
policy...3Shortly after this concession, in 1967 the NBPA finally gained a pension plan of 
$600 a month for players with ten years of service at age 65. The NBPA was also able to 
negotiate an 82 game regular season, and their first revision to standard player contracts, 
which raised the minimum rookie salary to $10,000 and the minimum pensioned 
veteran’s salary was raised to $12,500.  
In 1983 the league was faced with a major problem, as several franchises were 
suffering from substantial financial losses. These financial losses led to large amounts of 
deferred payments to players, which nearly caused a strike of the 1982 season. In 1983 
the player’s union and the league agreed to a groundbreaking collective bargaining 
agreement that would influence all the major sports leagues. The new agreement 
included: a salary cap guarantying the players between 53% and 57% of the NBA’s gross 
revenues and a guarantee that the league would maintain 253 player jobs even if there 
was a reduction in the number of teams.4 
At the conclusion of the 1995 season, the owners imposed a lock-out to put pressure 
on players in negotiations for the new collective bargaining agreement. In September of 
1995 the owners voted 24-5 in favor of the agreement reached between the union and the 
owners and the player representatives voted 25-2 in favor of the new agreement. The 
agreement was signed in June of 1996 and included: unrestricted free agency for all 
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4
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players following the conclusion of their contracts, a guarantee of 48.04% of all 
basketball related income to the players, a rookie salary cap with a graduated scale 
depending on what position in the draft the player was chosen, and the “Larry Bird 
Exemption” which allowed teams to re-sign their own free agents to any price.5 
After the 1997-98 season the owners voted to re-open the collective bargaining 
agreement, since thirteen of the NBA teams had claimed losses at the end of the season. 
In order for the owners to force the players union to renegotiate the agreement there was 
a work stoppage for the first time in NBA history on July 1, 1998 as the owners locked 
the players out. After losing half the season the players agreed on maximum players 
salaries based on number of years in the league, longer rookie contracts, and an escrow 
tax in 2001-02 if salary expenditures exceeded 55% of basketball related income.6 After 
the concessions made during the 1998 lockout, the NBA had a prosperous season. Since 
the lockout the NBPA and league have had successful negotiations including their talks 
which lead to the current collective bargaining agreement which is set to expire after the 
2010-11 season.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Ibid 
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NBA 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The current NBA collective bargaining agreement was agreed upon by the NBA 
and NBPA in 2005. The agreement will last through the 2010-2011 NBA season. The 
collective bargaining agreement contains all the relevant legal ramifications relating to 
disputes between the league and its constituent owners and the players who play for each 
individual franchise. The agreement outlines rules for player conduct, allocations for 
traveling expenses during the season, drug testing, player arbitration, rookie and veteran 
pay as well as other relevant regulations that are to be resolved between the league and 
the union. For the sake of this paper I will focus on sections in the agreement that relate 
to player contracts and the salary cap. In light of the recent economic recession, the NBA 
figures to have a very contentious debate over the parameters of the new collective 
bargaining agreement that would go into effect at the beginning of the 2011-2012 season. 
The most controversial elements of the collective bargaining agreement will be the new 
salary cap, the new restrictions on contracts given to free agents, and how to help 
struggling small market teams.  
NBA Salary Cap 
 The NBA Salary Cap is a “soft cap” meaning there is allowance for teams to pay 
out salaries that are higher than the league mandated salary cap. The Salary Cap is a 
figure that changes each year and is dependent on the calculation of BRI (Basketball 
Related Income). BRI is calculated based on the aggregate operating revenues received 
by the NBA, NBA Properties Inc, including any of its subsidiaries whether now in 
existence or created in the future, NBA Media Ventures LLC, any other entity which is 
controlled by the NBA. This includes regular season gate receipts, net of applicable taxes, 
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surcharges, imposts and other charges imposed by the government; all proceeds of any 
kind from the broadcast or exhibition, or the sale or license to broadcast or exhibit NBA 
preseason, Regular Season and Playoff games on any and all forms of radio, television, 
telephone, internet, or any other communications media; the sale of novelties in team-
identified stores located within such radius of the Teams home arena; as well as a 
percentage of sales of luxury seats and fixed arena signage.7The teams within the NBA 
agree to maximize BRI to the best of their abilities. For each year the salary cap will 
equal the percentage of projected BRI, less projected benefits, divided by the number of 
teams scheduled to play in the NBA during the year. The projected salary cap percentage 
has been 51% since the 2006-2007 season.8 So, the NBA salary cap has been 51% of BRI 
divided by the 30 teams that make up the NBA. The minimum team salary under the 
current agreement is 75% of the salary cap in a given year. If a team fails to make salary 
payments equal to or greater than the minimum team salary, the NBA will make that 
team make payments equal to the shortfall.9The NBA collective bargaining agreement 
holds that a team shall not exceed the salary cap mandated by the league; however there 
exists several exceptions to the salary cap which allow teams to have salary figures that 
exceed the league cap. These exceptions are what make the NBA salary cap a soft cap 
rather than a hard one. These exceptions include: The Veteran Free Agent Exception, the 
Disabled Player Exception, the Bi-annual Exception, the Mid-Level Salary Exception, the 
Rookie Exception, the Minimum Player Salary Exception, and the Traded Player 
Exception.  
                                                 
7
 2005 National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement. Article VII Section 1 pg. 95 
8
 Ibid Article VII Section 2 pg.120 
9
 Ibid Article VII Section 2 pg.122 
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Salary Cap Exceptions 
 The Veteran Free Agent Exception consists of the Qualifying Veteran Free Agent 
clause and the Non-qualifying Veteran Free Agent clause. The Qualifying Veteran Free 
Agent clause allows teams to pay the maximum amount to a player, who stays with a 
team for three seasons after being drafted by them and does not extend his contract after 
the second season. The players would then receive a maximum contract in his fourth 
season. The maximum contract for a player entering his fourth season would be 25% of 
the Salary Cap in effect at the time the contract is executed or 105% of the salary for the 
final season of the player’s rookie contract, or $9 million.10 This exception is commonly 
referred to as the Bird exception and was implemented so that teams would be able to 
exceed the cap in order to retain their own players. The Non-qualifying Veteran Free 
Agent clause allows a team to pay a premium for their own free agents after two seasons 
of playing with the team. The new contract can be 120% of the salary from their prior 
contract, or rookie contract and bonuses.11 The Disabled Player Exception allows a team 
to sign or acquire one replacement player to replace a player who, as a result of a 
disabling injury or illness is unable to render playing services. The Bi-annual exception, 
is an exception that each team can use each year to sign one or more players, not to 
exceed two season in length totaling up to a calculated amount. The amounts have been: 
$1.67 million, $1.75 million, $1.83 million, $1.91 million, $1.99 million, and $2.09 
million for the past six seasons in chronological order starting in 2005-06.12 The Mid-
Level Salary Exception gives teams the right to sign one or more player’s contracts not to 
exceed five years in length, which in aggregate, provide for salaries totaling up to 108% 
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 Ibid Article II Section 7 pg. 33 
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 Ibid Article VII Section 2 pg.123 
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 Ibid Article VII Section 2 pg.124 
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of the average player salary for the prior salary cap year. The Minimum Player Salary 
Exception gives teams the ability to sign a player to a contract, not exceeding two years 
in length that is equal to the minimum player salary applicable to that player. The Traded 
Player Exception allows teams to replace a traded player with one or more replacement 
players whose player contracts are acquired and are no more than 125% of the pre-trade 
salary of the traded player plus $100,000.  
Escrow and Tax Arrangement 
The NBA has implemented an Escrow account system to ensure that player 
salaries do not account for more than the recommended percentage of BRI. This is an 
important insurance policy for the league since it ensures that owners are protected from 
overpaying player salaries, which gives relief to teams that do not bring in as much 
revenue from ticket sales. The amount placed in the escrow account is called the 
aggregate compensation adjustment amount and it was set at the onset of the 2005 
collective bargaining agreement. The amount was 10% during the 2005-2006 season, 9% 
during the 2006-2010 seasons and is set to be 8% during the 2010-2011 season. With 
these percentages set an amount is deducted from each player’s salary and placed in the 
escrow account. The Escrow account is affected by two possible scenarios relating to the 
amount of BRI in a given year. The first scenario is an “overage”, and occurs when the 
total salaries and benefits for players in the league exceed the amount equal to the 
designated percentage of BRI for that year. In the event of an overage the NBA is entitled 
to receive from the escrow agent, the compensation amount placed into the account by 
each individual player. The second scenario is called an aggregate compensation 
adjustment amount shortfall and this occurs when the amount received by the NBA from 
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the escrow account is less than the aggregate compensation adjustment amount for that 
year. In the event of a shortfall, where the NBA pays too much in player salaries and 
cannot recuperate that amount from the escrow amount during that year, the aggregate 
compensation for the following year is reduced by the amount of the shortfall. In both of 
these scenarios the owners and league have an insurance policy in place, which ensures 
that player salaries do not exceed the recommended amount set forth in the agreement.  
 The tax level set forth in the collective bargaining agreement is one that has been 
widely accepted as the maximum salary allowable for NBA teams. It is simply referred to 
as the “Tax Level” in the agreement but is popularly referred to as the NBA luxury tax, 
which sets the maximum allowable salary for each team. The tax level is calculated by 
computing 61% of projected BRI, subtracting projected benefits for that year, and 
dividing this number by the number of teams in the league that year. Each team whose 
team salary exceeds the tax level any year is required to pay a tax to the NBA equal to the 
amount by which the team’s salary exceeds the tax level.13Teams are required to pay the 
tax no later than ten business days following the completion of the audit report for the 
prior year. The NBA distributes the funds that it receives from teams that have salaries 
above the tax level to each team that does not owe a tax an amount equal to the aggregate 
tax remitted to the NBA multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is one and the 
denominator of which is the number of teams in the NBA during that year.14Therefore the 
NBA has created an incentive for teams that do not exceed the tax level by rewarding 
them with the taxes of the teams that do exceed it. This system also allows smaller 
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 Ibid Article VII Section 12 pg. 211 
14
 Ibid Article VII Section 12 pg.213 
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market teams to benefit from exercising restraint in salary expenditures, and maintaining 
a level playing field with larger market teams who spend more on player salaries. 
Free Agency 
 NBA free agency allows players who have played out the entirety of their contract 
to either negotiate a contract with their current team or move to another team based on 
their choosing. The ability to choose where one wanted to play was a major development 
for professional sports and athletes. This power which previously belonged to the owners, 
is what transformed sports from an industry that was dominated by owners and leagues to 
an industry that is now dominated by athletes and sports agents. The NBA has a 
moratorium period in which players are free to negotiate with teams but not sign new 
contracts with teams that takes place right before free agency begins. This period has 
been scheduled for each season that is encompassed by the present collective bargaining 
agreement. The period is generally between the first day of July and lasts until the 
seventh, eighth, tenth, or eleventh day of July. The NBA has two major classifications for 
free agents. Unrestricted free agents are free agents that are free at any time beginning on 
the first day of the moratorium period to negotiate, and free at any time after the last day 
of the moratorium period to enter into, a player contract with any team. A restricted free 
agent is a free agent that is free at any time beginning on the first day of the moratorium 
period to negotiate a contract with his prior team and to negotiate an offer sheet with any 
other team other than his prior team, and is free at any time after the last day of the 
moratorium period to enter into a contract with his prior team or any offer sheet with any 
team other than his prior team.  
13 
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III. CHAPTER 3. MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
History 
Baseball’s labor history is one that extends far before the formation of the Major 
League Baseball Players Association. In fact the MLBPA is the fifth organization created 
to represent the interest of professional baseball players. Before the initial meeting of the 
MLBPA there was the National Brotherhood of Professional Baseball (1885-1890), the 
League Protective Players’ Association (1900-1902), The Baseball Players Fraternity 
(1912-1918), and The American Baseball Guild (1946). The stage was set for player 
unionization in professional baseball after the owners of the National league decided to 
implement the “reserve rule” in 1880, which allowed clubs to protect five players from 
signing with other teams after playing with a team for one year. This was a big change for 
players since they were used to being able to switch teams at will since most contracts 
were only for one year. “Players enjoyed the perfect freedom of free agency and, in fact, 
this system of the mid 1800s was much more competitive than the system that exists 
today.”15This reserve rule gradually increased to include every player on a team by the 
1887 season. The National Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players was formed in 1885 
was formed to curtail the power that was increasingly held by the owners.  
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 James Dworkin, Owners versus Players: Baseball and Collective Bargaining (Boston: Auburn House 
Publishing, 1981), pg. 8 
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By 1890 the players were so upset about the amount of control the owners held 
that they formed a rival league called the Players League. The aim of the Players league 
was to directly compete with the National League for fan support and revenue, and 
through this competition force the National League into some sort of a compromise that 
would be beneficial for both the league and the players. After the 1890 season a meeting 
between officials of both leagues signaled an end to both the Players league and the 
National Brotherhood, as the National  League assured players of no reprisals and fairer 
employment conditions, including a revision to the reserve clause to change it into an 
“option to renew” clause.16Working conditions did not change much after the agreement 
with the players as there still remained a maximum on salaries set at $2,400 per season, 
teams could pay a player whatever minimum they could, players were forced to purchase 
their own uniforms and suffer through poor travel conditions and hotel accommodations, 
and the reserve rule still applied to every player within the National League. After the 
1900 season, several leaders of the rival American League tried to persuade players to 
switch leagues in order to leave the oppressive conditions of the National League.17In the 
American League higher salaries could be paid and players were not bound to one team, 
so many players did in fact switch leagues. The American League was so successful that 
it was recognized by the National League in 1903. With the recognition by the National 
League and the players’ ability to negotiate higher contracts with the American League 
there was no need for a formal union, as both players and owners were satisfied with the 
agreement between leagues.  
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In 1914 the Federal League was set up as yet another rival league born from the 
poor sentiment some players felt about the working conditions under the National and 
American Leagues. The Ty Cobb strike, which occurred after Ty Cobb was suspended 
indefinitely after fighting with a spectator, caused the players to think that it was time for 
some sort of players association to exist in order to fight back against the owners. The 
Federal disbanded after 1915, with little progress made in the way of establishing a 
unified players union. In 1946 Robert Murphy organized the American Baseball Guild, 
whose aims were to redress the major grievances of that had existed since the beginning 
of professional baseball. The Guild’s primary aims were: putting an end to the reserve 
clause, arbitration over salaries and all other player-owner disputes, guaranteeing players 
a share in their purchase price, a minimum salary of $7,500 per season, and more 
equitable contractual arrangement than the one in place where owners could cancel a 
player’s contract on ten days’ notice.18The Guild failed to become the unified players 
association that it set out to be and it did not accomplish its major goals, however it did 
offer some small concessions in favor of the players. The league began to choose player 
representatives from each club to discuss working conditions with owners; these 
representatives were able to negotiate improvements in travel arrangements, exhibition 
pay, and a pension plan.19 
In 1953 the players of Major League Baseball hired J. Norman Lewis as legal 
counsel in matters between the players and owners. In 1954 the players supplemented this 
move by creating the Major League Baseball Player’s Association (MLBPA) that began 
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as just a means for players to have a united voice in dealing with the owners, not as a 
formal union. Under the direction of Marvin Miller, the MLBPA initiated the first 
collective bargaining agreement by 1968. The players received higher minimum salaries, 
increases in pension, disability, and health insurance benefits. Both sides also agreed to a 
grievance procedure which paved the way for future bargaining in good faith.20The next 
collective agreement was ratified in May of 1970 to last for three seasons, and included 
further minimum salary increases, and an extension of grievance arbitration. In 1972 the 
players went on strike for thirteen days, because of the owner’s failure to address the 
issues of pensions and payments for games missed due to strike. These two issues were 
addressed by the league and order was temporarily restored. In 1976 the owners locked 
the players out, in hopes of expediting the process of agreeing on a new agreement. The 
major concern for the players in negotiating the new agreement centered on changing the 
old reserve clause that was still present in baseball. The players had attempted numerous 
times through legal action to amend the reserve clause because it was such an 
impediment to player’s freedom to choose teams and it placed a ceiling on salaries. The 
first attack on the reserve clause came in the Toolson case, where New York Yankee 
player George Toolson filed suit against Major League Baseball because the New York 
Yankees had assigned Toolson to their minor league club and after refusing to play he 
was placed on the team’s ineligible list. Because of the reserve clause in his contract he 
could not play for another team and was thus barred from playing baseball that year. 
Toolson’s suit claimed that the reserve clause in his contract violated antitrust law. The 
Supreme Court had already ruled that Major League Baseball was exempt from the 
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antitrust law in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs and the court upheld this ruling in favor of Baseball again in the case 
against Toolson. The second case involved Curt Flood, who was a star outfielder for St. 
Louis for twelve years before being abruptly traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 
October of 1969. Curt Flood complained about the trade and asked Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn to declare him a free agent, but was denied since it held in his reserve clause that 
his playing rights belonged to the team he was traded to.21After this request was denied 
Flood filed a suit that once again charged MLB with violating anti-trust law with the 
reserve clause. Flood’s case was taken all the way to the Supreme Court, where the court 
ruled in favor of Major League Baseball. The court cited its earlier decisions in Toolson 
and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, and maintained that Baseball was exempt from 
anti-trust law.  
The breakthrough for the players came during the collective bargaining 
negotiations in 1976. After the 1975 season, pitchers Andy Messersmith and Dave 
McNally filed grievances with the MLBPA seeking to have an arbitrator declare them 
both free agents, since they had both completed one year contracts with their respective 
teams. Arbitrator Peter Seitz heard both the arguments from the MLBPA and the owners 
and ruled that both players were free agents since there was no existing contractual 
relationship between the players and their teams, and thus the players could not be 
reserved for another year of service. The result of Seitz’ arbitration decision “changed the 
nature of baseball’s historic perpetual reservation system into a reserve system limited to 
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but a single one-year option on a player’s services.”22The owners immediately 
understood that this meant that after a player’s contract expired and the player was 
reserved for one season they would become a free agent and have the ability to choose 
which team they wanted to play for and the amount of money they required to play. The 
1976 collective bargaining agreement included the new system of free agency, which “in 
essence gave each team a six-year guarantee on a player’s services, after which time the 
player and club could agree to further contractual terms or the player could become a free 
agent.”The agreement also included how teams would be compensated for free agents 
that signed with other teams. The compensation was that a team who signed another 
team’s free agent would be required to give the player’s former team a draft pick in the 
June Amateur Player Draft. After small strikes in 1980, 1981, 1984 and 1985 the next 
major year for collective bargaining came in 1990. “Management’s collusion activities 
after the 1985 labor agreement added tension to the 1990 negotiations.”23 This collusion 
referred to the owners refusing to bid on free agents following the 1985 season. 
Arbitrator Thomas Roberts also found the owners guilty of collusion by avoiding free 
agents following the 1986 and 1987 seasons as well. The 1990 negotiations also focused 
on the topic of revenue sharing, or the transfer of revenues from one team to another, 
which the owners wanted to implement in order to discourage competition and lessen 
economic incentive to overbid for players. After a 32-day lockout, the MLBPA and MLB 
finally came together in forming a new labor agreement. The new agreement included: an 
increase in the minimum salary from $68,000 to $100,000, and increase in pension 
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benefit contributions from $36 million to $55 million a year, an increase in salary 
arbitration, and the topic of revenue sharing was to be addressed by a task force and 
reviewed during the next agreement.24 
With the major issues not settled from the 1990 negotiations and owners 
complaining of economic hardships, the stage was set for a turbulent agreement in 1994. 
The owners wanted to initiate a salary cap in baseball to curtail the rising salaries of 
players, and to create a more equal playing field for large and small market teams. The 
players vehemently opposed a salary cap and wanted to maintain the status quo. The 
result was a 232-day strike that did not end until Government intervention. The owners 
and union finally came together in agreement in November 1996. The new collective 
bargaining agreement increased minimum salaries once again, but also included a major 
change in the form of a new luxury tax. A luxury tax was implemented that placed a tax 
on team’s payrolls exceeding $51 million in 1997, $55 million in 1998 and $58.9 million 
in 1999. The tax rate was set at 35% for the 1997-1998 season and 34% for the 1999 
season. “Proceeds from the tax go into a revenue-sharing pool, along with monies from a 
new 2.5% tax on player salaries. The pool is distributed to thirteen small-market teams to 
enable them to compete better financially.”25The 2002 and 2007 collective bargaining 
agreements were agreed upon relatively quickly and without work stoppages.  
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MLB 2007 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 The current MLB collective bargaining agreement was agreed upon at the 
conclusion of the 2007 season and is set to last until the completion of the 2011 season. 
Though MLB has a long history of contentious agreements, the 2007 agreement was 
reached without much disagreement from either side. The main issues I will focus on will 
include the current free agency system of MLB, its revenue sharing program and how it 
deals with team salaries without any form of salary cap. 
Free Agency 
A player enters into free agency following the completion of his contract, and any 
player with six or more years of Major League service who has not executed a contract 
for the next succeeding season is eligible to become a free agent.26The former club of a 
free agent is offered compensation for their player if their player is considered to be a 
Type A or Type B player. A type A player is defined as a player who ranks in the upper 
twenty percent of his respective position group. A type B player is a player who ranks in 
the upper forty percent but not in the upper twenty percent of his respective position 
group. A team receives compensation only if its free agent signs a contract prior to 
December 1 or its free agent signs a contract with another team after his former team has 
offered salary arbitration. The compensation for a type A player is a draft pick in the 
amateur baseball draft and an added draft pick in the Major League Rule 4 Draft. 
Compensation for a type B player is a draft pick in the Major League Rule 4 draft. Clubs 
are limited in the number of Type A and B players they are allowed to sign in a given 
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year. If there are fourteen or less than no team can sign more than one type A or B player. 
If there are between 15 and 38, no club can sign more than two type A or B players. If 
there are from 39 to 62 then no team can sign more than three. The quota for signing 
these premium free agents goes up accordingly.27    
Competitive Balance Tax 
The key element of the 1996 collective bargaining agreement was the luxury tax, which 
provided incentive for teams to lower their salary figures and be more efficient with 
money spent on player contracts. This tax is the closest thing MLB has to a salary cap, 
but its restraint has not limited the large market teams from spending enormous amounts 
on salaries. Teams are assessed a competitive balance tax on the difference between its 
final club payroll and the tax threshold for a given year. The tax threshold has been set as: 
$148 million in the 2007 season, $155 million in the 2008 season, $162 million in the 
2009 season, $170 million in the 2010 season, and $178 million for the 2011 season. The 
tax rates are 22.5%, 30%, and 40%. “A club shall be subject to a competitive balance tax 
rate one level higher than the rate applicable to it in the previous contract year for each 
consecutive contract year in which its payroll is above the tax threshold.”28 This means 
that if a club is paying a tax of 22.5% and its payroll remains above the threshold, the 
next year it will pay 30%, this continues until the maximum tax of 40% is reached. 
Teams can also go down tax levels by lowering their payroll below the tax threshold. The 
proceeds from the competitive tax are allocated as follows: The first $2.5 million are 
reallocated to teams based on whether the teams had to pay the tax from buying out a 
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player’s contract. 75% of the remaining proceeds are used to fund benefits for players 
and 25% of the remaining proceeds are contributed to the industry growth fund.29 
The Revenue Sharing Plan 
 The Revenue Sharing Plan was started as a means for smaller market teams to 
stay competitive with the larger market teams by distributing some of the extra revenue 
collected by large market teams with the smaller market teams in the league. The plan is 
constructed as a pool, where each team pays 31% of its operating revenues to a putative 
pool called the central fund. The money in the fund is “reallocated among the clubs based 
on each club’s applicable performance factor. Clubs with a positive performance factor 
shall be contributors and clubs with negative performance factors shall be recipients 
under the central fund component.”30The performance factors are included as an 
attachment to the collective bargaining agreement. The amount that a contributor has to 
contribute is calculated by multiplying their performance factor by the net transfer value 
of the central fund. Recipients receive the amount of their performance factor multiplied 
by the net transfer value of the central fund.31A team’s performance factor may be 
adjusted if a “club opens a new stadium or the compound annual growth rate of the 
team’s net local revenue lags or exceeds the CAGR of the industry’s net local revenue by 
ten percentage points or more over any three-year period.”32Since the purpose of the 
Revenue Sharing Plan is to improve the competitiveness of the game and to improve the 
performance of smaller market teams, the league has mandated that each club that 
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receives money from the plan must report on the performance-related uses to which it put 
its revenue sharing receipts by April 1 of the following year.33 
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IV. CHAPTER 4. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
 
History 
The beginning of NFL collective bargaining started as the other sports had, in the 
midst of player anguish over the amount of power wielded by the owners in the National 
Football League. The players began to mobilize against the owners in 1956 when players 
sought the assistance of Creighton Miller, the first general manager of the Cleveland 
Browns, in helping form a player’s association. By November of 1956, a number of 
players had agreed to let Miller and the newly formed National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA) represent their interests.34The players met and after their first 
meeting came up with a list of demands for the owners which included: a minimum 
$5,000 a year salary, uniform per diem pay for players, rule forcing team to pay for 
football equipment, and a payment plan for injured players.35The players submitted these 
proposals to the league, but they were not accepted and the league did not recognize the 
NFLPA as an official player’s union. Though the players did not have their demands met 
they were encouraged by a Supreme Court ruling in 1957. Bill Radovich filed a suit 
against the NFL after the NFL denied his request to move from Detroit and sign with a 
team in California. His suit claimed that the NFL was operating in violation of anti-trust 
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law. In 1957 the court ruled in Radovich v. NFL, that the NFL was in fact subject to anti-
trust law.36 This case was monumental for the player’s since it gave them legal power to 
file suit against the NFL if it did not negotiate with them. It also proved detrimental for 
the league because it did not receive the same anti-trust exemption that baseball had 
received and thus exposed it to the threat of ongoing legal action if it did not comply with 
player demands.   
In 1960 the American Football League was created to compete with the NFL, and 
the players tried to use the new league as leverage for higher salaries and increased 
benefits. The players were not able to make much progress even with the leverage from 
the AFL, and after the two leagues merged in 1966 the players were left even more 
dissatisfied with working conditions.  After the failure of the NFLPA to mount opposition 
to the merger of the two leagues, Bernie Parrish of the Cleveland Browns sought the 
assistance of the Teamsters Union in negotiating with the owners. In 1968 the NFL 
agreed to recognize the NFLPA as an official union with the stipulation that the 
Teamsters Union be eliminated from partnership with the players. After the NFL 
recognized the NFLPA, the newly recognized union proposed a new pension plan, which 
was rejected by the owners. The rejection of the plan caused the first player strike. The 
conclusion of the strike came after the NFL and NFLPA negotiated the first collective 
bargaining agreement in 1968. The new agreement included: a minimum salary of $9,000 
for rookies and $10,000 for veterans, exhibition pay of $50 per game, and a retirement 
age of 65.37 The problem with this agreement was that the NFLPA did not have the 
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support of the American Football League Players Association, since despite the leagues 
merger there was not a merger of player associations. “The two players associations 
combined forces for the first time in 1970, when it was again time to bargain with the 
NFL owners.”38The 1970 negotiations proved problematic, and the players went on a 
brief two-day strike before eventually signing a four-year agreement. The new agreement 
made minimal changes to the original one and included: an increase in the minimum 
rookie salary to $12,500 and $13,000 for the veterans, the right of players to have agents, 
and the right to impartial arbitration of injury grievances.39 
Going into the next round of collective bargaining the players union became 
stronger and was set on challenging many of the NFL’s labor institutions. The largest of 
these was the Rozelle Rule. The Rozelle rule says “that when any individual plays out his 
contract and elects to sign with another team, his new owners must send his old team a 
player or players from their current roster and if the team s cannot agree on an exchange, 
League commissioner Pete Rozelle would choose who the compensation would 
be.”40Players filed a suit against the NFL claiming that the Rozelle rule violated anti-trust 
law since it interfered with a player’s ability to freely move from one team to another 
after fulfilling his contractual agreement. The suit was Mackey v. NFL and the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Rozelle Rule was in violation of anti-trust law since it “constituted a 
restrain in trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.”41The results of the suit 
would not be included into a CBA until 1977. The players had to continue to fight the 
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owners in the court room since they did not have much success in the 1974 negotiations. 
After the decision in Mackey v. NFL was reached in 1976 the players were finally able to 
force the owners to meet some of their demands. The 1977 CBA included: increased 
benefits, reforms in the waiver system, and the end of the Rozelle Rule.  
Between 1977 and 1981 there was very little player movement and the players 
found the reason to be that owners had very little incentive to sign free agents because of 
the revenue sharing program occurring in the league. Teams were “sharing TV and gate 
revenues on nearly an equal basis.”42The players wanted to take advantage of the revenue 
sharing and during the negotiations for the 1982 agreement they asked the league to pay 
players 55% of the league-wide revenue. The owners rejected this proposal, and the 
players subsequently went on strike after the second week of regular season games in 
1982. After two months of strike the two sides finally came to agreement on a new CBA 
that would increase player salaries and benefits to a total package worth $1.28 
billion.43This was far from the proposal that the players had made, and once again the 
owners escaped the bargaining process without having to drastically change the current 
system, which benefited them tremendously. The NFL owners were able to win most of 
these battles because, unlike the MLB or NBA, the NFL owners were unified and this 
unity was so strong because they shared revenues. They also had the advantage of dealing 
with athletes with relatively short career-spans, which meant they could wait-out player 
strikes.44 
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The players decided to tackle the problem of free agency during the 1987 CBA 
talks. The owners immediately rejected the player’s demands for free agency, and once 
again the player’s went on strike. The owners responded by hiring replacement players to 
play while the strike lasted. The owners never relented on the players demands and the 
players were forced to return to the field without free agency and without a new CBA. 
The players once again counted on litigation to force the owners to listen to their 
demands. The players filed another anti-trust suit named Powell v. NFL, which attacked 
the “first refusal/compensation” system that allowed a team the first right to sign their 
free agent player, and if the free agent chose to sign with another team, then his former 
team received first round draft choices as compensation. This rule limited a player’s 
ability to sign with a new team since most teams felt that the compensation of a first 
round draft choice was too steep of a price to pay for signing a free agent. The NFLPA 
won the suit in Minnesota federal court, however the owners appealed the decision and 
the trial was taken to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The owners also enacted “Plan 
B” “as a precautionary measure, which freed players at the bottom of the roster from the 
first refusal/compensation system. Under Plan B clubs could restrict 37 players and 
continue to subject them to the first refusal/compensation system, while players who 
were not restricted could sign with other teams without restriction at the end of their 
contracts.”45Finally, in 1989 the Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of the owners claiming that 
“as long as the union represented the players, they had no rights under anti-trust laws to 
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sue owners.”46The players reacted drastically by disbanding the union and continuing to 
pursue legal action against the owners as individuals.  
The NFLPA now stood as just a player’s association rather than a union, meaning 
it could not negotiate for a CBA, so the players were without a new CBA since the 1982 
agreement. The NFLPA still remained active in funding legal action against the owners, 
and a new suit was filed in 1990 under the name McNeil v. NFL. The McNeil suit 
claimed that “Plan B rules restricting free agents violated the anti-trust laws, and the 
players had a right to sue since they were no longer a union.”47In 1992 the Minnesota 
federal court ruled in favor of the players in the McNeil case ruling that “NFL’s Pan B 
free agency system was illegal, and that it substantially harmed the effect on competition 
for player’s services and violated antitrust laws.”48 “By late 1992 there was leverage on 
both sides. Players had managed to enjoin Plan B and were proceeding to claim damages 
for all players damaged by that system. But the owners were appealing the McNeil 
decision and would have no liability if it were reversed.”49With both sides locked in legal 
battle, the stage was set for a settlement and possible agreement. A settlement was 
reached in 1993, where both sides made significant compromises. The owners agreed to 
free agency, but only if the player’s accepted a salary cap. In 1993 the NFLPA obtain 
authorization to recertify itself as an official union, and thus renew its ability to negotiate 
a new CBA.  
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The 1993 CBA took months of hard bargaining between NFLPA negotiators and 
the league commissioner Paul Tagliabue. The final agreement included: free agency, all 
player’s pensions where retroactively increased by 40%, the players would receive a 
percentage of football revenue, and there would be a salary cap. The 1993 CBA has been 
extended five times, including most recently in 2006 when it was extended through the 
2011 season. 
 
NFL 2006 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The current NFL collective bargaining agreement is an extension of the original 
1993 agreement. The extension was approved in 2006 and was set to last six years, “but 
in 2008 the owners unanimously voted to truncate the deal by two years. The NFL is now 
heading toward a work stoppage in March 2011 when it expires.”50Until the 2008 
decision by the owners, the NFLPA and NFL had had successful negotiations, since the 
main tenets of the salary cap, and free agency were settled upon in 1993.  
Free Agency 
 Any player with five or more accrued seasons, or with four or more accrued 
seasons in any capped year, shall, at the expiration of his player contract become an 
unrestricted free agent.51These players are free to sign with the team of their choosing, 
and the team that signs them can do so without penalty or compensation. A veteran player 
with three or more accrued seasons, but less than five becomes a restricted free agent at 
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the end of his player contract. A restricted free agents team has the right of first refusal 
and the rights to compensation if the team tenders the player an offer before the first date 
of restricted free agent signings.52The amount of compensation a team receives depends 
on the amount of the contract offered to the free agent. A detailed list of contract offers 
and their respective compensation amount is included within Article XIX Section 2 of the 
CBA. The NFL has a special designation for a limited number of unrestricted free agents 
called the “franchise tag.” Each club is permitted to designate one of its players who 
would otherwise be an unrestricted free agent as a Franchise Player each season. The club 
becomes the only club that can negotiate or sign the player to a contract while he is 
designated as a franchise player. 
 Once a team has designated a player as a franchise player it must notify the 
league of which one of two potential required contracts it will offer the player.53The first 
option is a one year contract worth either 120% of his prior year salary or the average of 
the five largest salaries prior year salaries for players at the position at which the 
Franchise Player played the most games during the prior year, depending on which 
amount is highest. The second option is a one year contract for the average of the five 
largest salaries in the league that year, for players at the position at which the player 
played the most games during the prior year.54A team is also allowed to designate one 
unrestricted or restricted free agent as a Transition Player in lieu of designating a 
Franchise Player. A team must tender a Transition Player a one year contract worth the 
average of the ten largest prior year salaries for players at the position at which he played 
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the most games in the prior season or 120% of his prior year salary depending on which 
amount is greater. The offer can be withdrawn by the team at anytime but the player 
becomes an unrestricted free agent as soon as the tender is withdrawn.55 
Salary Cap 
 The NFL is the only league included in this paper that has a hard salary cap, 
meaning a team cannot go above the league mandated cap and there are no exceptions to 
allow teams to circumvent the cap. The NFL salary cap goes into effect in any year when 
the total player costs for all NFL teams equals or exceeds 56.074% of total revenue. If the 
total player costs fall below 46.868% of total revenue in a year with a salary cap then the 
salary cap will be removed the following year. When the league has a salary cap there is 
also a league-wide salary of 50% of total league revenue. The salary caps for each year 
are set within the CBA and are listed as: $102 million for 2006, $109 million for 2007, 
57.5% of total revenue divided by the number of teams for 2008, 57.5% of total revenue 
divided by the number of teams for 2009, 58% of total revenue divided by the number of 
teams for 2010, and 58% of total revenue divided by the number of teams for 2011.56The 
league has implemented an adjustment mechanism in case league salaries fall too far 
below or above the amount necessary for a salary cap. An adjustment will be triggered if 
during a capped year the league wide player costs exceed or fall below the trigger 
percentage for that year multiplied by total revenues for that year.57 The “trigger 
percentage” is the percentage that player costs should fall within during each salary 
capped year. The trigger percentages are 59% for the 2006 and 2007 years, 59.5% for the 
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2008 and 2009 years and 60% for the 2010 and 2011 years. If there is a league shortfall 
then the amount will be reduced by any remaining league excess from previous years and 
a deduction from each club’s team salary. If an adjustment is triggered by a league excess 
then a pro rata share of the excess will be applied to each club.58 
 The NFL has also included a minimum team salary to maintain the competitive 
balance of the league, and to increase to overall revenues of the league. The minimum 
team salary was set at 84% of the salary cap for the 2006 season and it increases by 1.2% 
each year, but cannot be greater than 90%. If any teams fall below the minimum salary in 
a given year then it is required to pay the difference in its team salary and the minimum 
by April 15 of the next year.59  
Final Eight Plan 
The final eight plan was placed in the CBA in the event that there would be a 
season without a salary cap, such as the current 2010 season. Since the possibility has 
become a reality I am compelled to include this portion of the CBA in this paper since it 
relates to free agency during an uncapped year. The plan states that the four teams that 
participated in the NFC and AFC championship games are not permitted to negotiate and 
sign any unrestricted free agents unless the unrestricted free agent became a free agent as 
a result of the waiver system, or the unrestricted free agent was under contract with that 
team on the date of the players most recent contract. Each of the four playoff teams that 
lost before the championship games are also not permitted to sign any unrestricted free 
agents unless that player became a free agent as a result of the waiver system, he was 
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under contract with that team, a player has a first year salary of $4,925,000 or more, or a 
player with a first year salary of $3,275,000 and an annual increase in future contract 
years of no more than 30% of the first contract year salary.60Each of the eight club’s is 
allowed to sign one unrestricted free agent for each unrestricted free agent that it loses to 
another team as long as the new player does not have a first year salary higher than the 
first year salary given to the player that was lost. This plan was enacted so that when 
there is an uncapped year, the best teams in the league to not take advantage of the lack 
of salary cap by signing more top quality players. It is an insurance policy for smaller 
market teams who need the salary cap to stay competitive with the larger teams in the 
league.  
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V. CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF THE NFL, NBA, AND MLB COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
 
 
  
 
The labor history of each major American sports league has been filled with the 
constant battle between owners and players to strike a balance between competitive pay 
for players and profit maximization for owner. While both of the these entities battle for 
their own self interest, the fan is left hoping that the result of each labor agreement brings 
about an increase in competitive balance, and a more enjoyable entertainment experience. 
None of the three leagues has been able to secure a perfect agreement, and after decades 
of collective bargaining there is still confrontation before and during the negotiations for 
each CBA that the leagues enact. Despite the differences in each league there are many 
similarities in the elements that have been agreed upon in each CBA. The major elements 
that are shared by all leagues include Free Agency, Salary Caps and exceptions, and 
Revenue Sharing. Each league has attempted to create a unique structure for each of these 
items to match the ideology of the league and to best benefit the players and owners in 
each league. While each league has had its share of legal issues and conflicts coming to 
agreement on the terms of the major elements of the CBA, each league has done well for 
itself as popularity for sports has grown in the United States as have revenues for the 
major leagues. “The median NBA team had an operating income of over $9 million in 
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2005/06 the median NFL team had an operating income of over $35 million in 2005, and 
the median MLB team had an operating income of over $16 million in 2005.”61The 
increased income has become both a blessing and a curse for the sports leagues however, 
since the increase in income calls for both players and owners to demand a higher share 
of the revenue. In comparing the CBA’s of all three leagues I will look at how each 
leagues approach to collective bargaining differs and how they are similar and how each 
approach has merit. In doing this comparison I hope to find the basic principles that will 
be beneficial for the collective bargaining process going forward. 
Free Agency 
 The basic concepts of free agency are practiced by all three leagues. All leagues 
adopted free agency late in their developments. The reserve clause was the pre-dominant 
contractual clause that dictated where a player played before free agency was adopted. 
The reserve clause bound a player to the team that his contract belonged to, and for most 
of the early history of the sports league it meant that a player played for one team 
throughout his career. “The reserve clause gave teams a monopsony power over their 
players. Monopsony, a market structure containing only one buyer, tilts bargaining power 
strongly in favor of team owners, as the players cannot sell their talents to other 
teams.”62This practice was also problematic because it allowed teams to punish players or 
demote them, without the possibility of a player being able to play for another team, so 
players were forced to accept demotion or punishment or not be paid.  
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 While MLB was able to maintain its reserve system through its anti-trust 
exception granted to it via the 1922 decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. 
National League, the other two leagues had to fight the reserve clause through collective 
bargaining. In all cases the reserve clause was extinguished leaving the system of free 
agency. Free agency today allows players to move freely from one team to another at the 
end of their contractual agreements or after a designated amount of time in the league. 
The major distinction in free agents today is unrestricted free agents and restricted free 
agents. The only league without the explicit terms restricted and unrestricted is baseball 
but its free agency is similar to the other leagues. In all three leagues there is a procedure 
reserved to a player’s former team for keeping a free agent. In the NFL and MLB there is 
a compensation rule that allows the team that loses a restricted free agent, which occurs 
when a player is offered a contract by his former team but refuses it, to be compensated 
with a draft pick in the next occurring players draft.  
The NBA does not have such a policy, but it gives a restricted free agent’s former 
team the right of first refusal in negotiating with a player and the ability to sign a player 
for more than any other team in the league can offer. This agreement is known as “Bird 
rights” which allow a team to go over the tax to resign their own free agents. The NFL 
has given teams added protection in keeping their top free agents with the ability to 
appoint a free agent as a franchise player. With the franchise tag a team protects a player 
from free agency, at the cost of paying them a large one season contract. There has not 
been a significant amount of debate on the effectiveness on free agency, since the process 
has become streamlined and successful since its inception. The only question is whether 
each leagues free agency policy gives players adequate freedom of mobility and teams 
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adequate means to keep key free agents. The only problem arises in baseball where large 
spending franchises, are able to obtain marquee free agents with the only cost being a 
draft pick. For most teams the loss of a draft pick is not a significant deterrent in 
outbidding smaller market teams for their “big name” free agents. This problem “is the 
expected deleterious effect free agency might have on competitive balance, since it 
permits a few teams to accumulate the most talented players.”63 
 The results have been mixed for the effects of free agency on competitive balance 
and player evaluation. Economists Leeds and Kowalewski found that free agency in the 
NFL “only significantly affected the level of play for players in the bottom .25 quartile 
who could drastically increase their pay by improving their performance, while players in 
the top .75 who were already well paid had less incentive to play harder.”64The study 
shows that free agency might not be that significant in improving the competitive balance 
in the league in the majority of players are not affected by the ability to gain higher 
salaries with different teams. Another economic take on free agency comes from an 
interpretation of the Coase theorem, which states “players go to the teams that value their 
services most highly, regardless of the contractual relationship between players and 
owners.”65Both of these ideas center around the idea that free agency does little to 
actually affect the level of completion. This is mostly true in the NBA and NFL where 
salary caps do not allow teams to win a player by the shear amount of money it can pay 
him, but in MLB free agency has played a very large role in player movement since 
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teams like the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox can outbid most smaller market 
teams, despite there being an obvious high regard for a premium player’s services. 
Salary Cap 
The salary cap is the most revolutionary concept that has emerged from the 
collective bargaining process. The idea of having a maximum amount that each team is 
allotted to spend on players seems like an obvious concept to adapt in the interest of 
fairness, but it is an idea that has been under attack by player’s unions since the idea first 
came about. For players the salary cap is a means of keeping salaries low and disabling 
teams from bidding on them during free agency. For owners the salary cap is a means of 
limiting the amount of revenue they get from operations that they have to spend on player 
salaries. A salary cap allows owners to take away larger profits. For most fans the salary 
cap is a means of keeping the leagues competitive. Without a salary cap the larger market 
teams with the wealthier, more loose-spending owners are able to buy victories and 
outperform small market teams without the financial means to compete. The salary cap 
levels the playing field and curtails out-of-control spending. All sides have relevant 
points. MLB is the only league that does not have a salary cap; instead it has a tax for 
teams that go above the recommended salary limit. In MLB many teams exceed the limit 
and pay the tax. The NFL is the only league that has a hard salary cap. The hard salary 
cap means that teams are not allowed to be over the salary cap and there are no 
exceptions that allow a team to be over the cap, however teams in the NFL are still able 
to pay out salaries that amount to more than the salary because of minor loopholes in the 
cap. The NBA also has a salary cap, it is determined by a percentage of Basketball 
Related Income that a team is allowed to spend on player salaries. The NBA salary cap is 
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not a hard cap because there are several exceptions that allow a team to go over the cap in 
order to keep their free agents and sign new free agents at the end of every year. “The 
most egregious exception to the soft salary cap was called the Bird Exception, named 
after Larry Bird, of the Boston Celtics. The Bird Exception allowed a team to pay any 
amount of money to keep one of its own players who had become a free agent, without 
regard to the cap.”66The Bird exception has now been limited, so that a team cannot 
spend any amount of money it wanted, but rather a team is now allowed to spend the 
maximum salary allowable to a player based on years of experience. The NBA does have 
a penalty tax that is assessed to teams whose team salaries exceed the cap. This tax has 
not stopped many of the top tier teams like the Los Angeles Lakers and Boston Celtics 
from raising their team salaries beyond the cap in order to remain competitive from year 
to year.  
The NFL and NBA caps are very similar except for a couple important 
differences. The first difference is the NFL pays a higher percentage of its designated 
gross revenue (DGR) to players. The NFL is able to pay this higher percentage because 
“The NFL counts less luxury-box revenue in DGR than the NBA counts in BRI. BRI 
includes all luxury-box revenue while DGR includes only the ticket revenue from luxury 
boxes.”67The NFL does not share revenue from concessions in luxury-boxes which 
accounts for a significant amount of revenue. The second major difference is an NFL 
team’s reported salary does not include some player bonuses. Since football does not 
have guaranteed contracts, there are large amounts of money placed in signing bonuses, 
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and performance incentive bonuses. Most of these bonuses count against the salary cap as 
wages that are likely to be earned, but there are some “bonuses for meeting previously 
unmet goals that count as not likely to be earned, which do not count against the cap.”68  
MLB has come under a great amount of criticism for not adopting a salary cap. 
The comparison of the development of a salary cap in NBA with the lack of one in the 
MLN has been summed up in economic terms by Goothius saying: 
The salary cap system employed by the NBA is an example of communitarian 
capitalism. The presence of a strong commissioner and a commitment by 
management and labor to work together to promote the common good of the sport 
had pulled the NBA out of a quagmire and made it a success. This contrasted with 
the picture of “individualistic capitalism” employed by the MLB, in which the 
union and owners were unable to agree on a salary cap.69   
Though it seems that individualistic capitalism may be hindering the progress of baseball, 
there is basis to support the system of not having a salary cap. “One danger of payroll 
caps is that they may be porous and they create temptation for violating the rules. A 
system in which cheaters are more successful than those who play by the rules may be 
even less inviting than one in which teams fortunate enough to own rights to high-
revenue areas are more successful”70This point holds strong considering both the NFL 
and NBA have salary caps yet a large percentage of the teams operate with player salaries 
above the cap. In these systems it seems teams are rewarded for their abilities to take 
advantage of the exceptions to the cap, or find ways to circumvent it. In fact in 2005 nine 
of the thirty-two NFL teams had payrolls exceeding the official 2005 salary cap, and 
twenty-three of the thirty NBA teams had payrolls that exceeded the 2005 salary 
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cap.71The fact that the MLB does not have a salary cap makes it more susceptible to 
criticism from those who complain that the lack of cap makes play more uneven, even 
though the same criticism could easily be placed on the NFL or NBA whose enforcement 
of the cap is rather lax.  
 The difference in leagues with the salary cap and the league without one would 
also extend to the amount of competition amongst teams. “Comparing MLB to the NFL 
and the NBA, in spite of fewer available playoff spots, over the last two decades, 20 
franchises have appeared in the World Series compared with 19 in the Super Bowl and 15 
in the NBA finals.”72This shows that even without a salary cap there has been more parity 
in MLB than there has been in the other two leagues in regards to the amount of teams 
with a realistic chance to win a world championship. This statistic is surprising given that 
the MLB has the largest difference in salary between the team with the highest payroll 
and the team with the lowest payroll. The New York Yankees have the highest payroll, 
totaling $206,333,389 and the Pittsburgh Pirates have the lowest, totaling $34,943,000. 
The $171 million difference is staggering yet the New York Yankees were not in the 
most recent championship, instead it was played between the San Francisco Giants with a 
salary of $97 million and the Texas Rangers with a payroll of only $55 million.73 Neither 
of these teams had ever won a World Series before, and it was the first time the Texas 
Rangers had played in a World Series.  
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Though the teams with lower salaries on average do significantly worse than the 
free-spending teams there is no significant assurance that the larger teams will win it all. 
A large reason that there is more parity in MLB is because without a cap teams are able 
to lure free agents with large bids. This contrasts with the NBA system of individual 
player salary caps. “Individual salary caps are likely to increase competitive imbalance 
because they encourage players to rely more on their preference for joining a winning 
team than on differences between salary offers. Individual player salary caps probably 
help the highest revenue teams increase both their profits and their playing talent.”74 
 In analyzing the difference in the percentage of revenue that players receive from 
the different leagues, it has been found that even without a salary cap the players in MLB 
receive close to the same percentage of the leagues total revenue or less than players in 
the NFL or NBA. In 2007 the MLB had total revenue of over $5.6 billion and $2.8 billion 
of this revenue went to player compensation.75Player compensation represented 51% of 
baseball revenue. This percentage is significantly lower than the salary cap in the NFL 
which is set at 57.5% of total revenue and close to the NBA salary cap which is set at 
51% of BRI. MLB does have to spend significantly more on its player development 
system but it still spends about the same amount on player salaries as the NBA despite 
having larger revenues. This data shows that MLB players are worse off than their 
counterparts in other leagues considering they get a lower percentage of the leagues 
revenue.  
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Revenue Sharing 
 Revenue sharing is a relatively new idea that has been influential in recent CBA’s. 
Each league has a revenue sharing clause in their CBA that dictates how much revenue 
each team must give to the league to be split up amongst the teams. The revenue sharing 
plan works to help smaller market teams, by giving them a share of revenue from larger 
market teams. Revenue sharing allows teams to stay competitive and provides incentive 
for small market teams to improve by using the revenue it gains. “The NFL is the most 
socialist, sharing revenues from its huge television contract and merchandise sales almost 
equally and gate receipts 66/34 to the home and visiting teams respectively.”76This 
system has allowed every team in the NFL to enjoy the fruits of the profitable business, 
and to keep most teams competitive from year to year. The NBA has the least 
pronounced revenue sharing program. Its program is based in its luxury tax, which taxes 
teams with high payrolls and distributes the proceeds to teams that stay below the league 
cap. The NBA revenue sharing program has largely helped to keep payrolls down, but 
does not help or force smaller teams to spend money gained from the luxury tax on 
players. The MLB revenue sharing plan explicitly demands that teams spend the money it 
gets from revenue sharing on players or utilities that help the performance of the team in 
subsequent years. While the NFL and NBA revenue sharing plans have worked smoothly 
there have been some problems with the MLB plan. The players and agents have argued 
that many teams that receive money from revenue sharing do not spend it on players but 
rather pocket the money as profits. There is reason to argue this considering in 2009 the 
Marlins, Pirates, Reds, Blue Jays and Royals received approximately $40 million in 
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revenue sharing yet the Pirates had a payroll of only $47 million and the Marlins of only 
$36.8 million.77 If these teams received so much money on revenue sharing on top of gate 
receipts and television rights, then it is possible to believe that some teams are not using 
the money in a way that improves performance but rather as a way to increase profits. 
The other opposition comes from owners like the late George Steinbrenner, who make a 
similar claim, and hold that the large market teams like the Yankees are carrying the 
small market teams and these small teams are not doing anything to improve themselves. 
The owner compared the program to a socialist state where the poor teams live off of the 
rich teams, while doing little to benefit the system as a whole.78While both sides might be 
right the fact is revenue sharing does help teams and makes sense especially in baseball 
where there is no salary cap. The problem with revenue sharing in basketball and football 
is that it “reduces the financial incentive of each franchise to acquire more talent, because 
the payoff to winning is constrained by the share paid to other franchises.”79Therefore 
teams in the NFL have little incentive to pay high player salaries since they know they 
will only receive close to the same amount as other teams. This problem is not big in the 
NBA since revenue is not shared as equally, so each team has its own financial benefit in 
mind when pursuing top free agents.  
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VI. CHAPTER 6. OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS 
  
 
 
With each of the collective bargaining agreements for the three major American 
sports set to expire in 2011 it is appropriate to look at how negotiations will fare going 
into future CBAs. Each league has had a history of contentious battles over labor 
practices, and each league has had growing success in popularity, commercial ratings and 
revenue. The last several years however, have proven to be difficult for every American 
industry as the United States has faced one of the worst recessions in its history. The 
sports world could not escape this recession, as it affected ticket sales and decreased 
spending by most owners. The recent recession has exacerbated the existing problems 
facing the players unions and owners, and will most likely force hard negotiations from 
both sides.  
 NBA commissioner David Stern has projected that the league would lose 
approximately $400 million for the 2009-10 season. This figure doubles the $200 million 
that the NBA has lost in each of the past four seasons.80The players have maintained that 
the losses were not the result of rising salaries but rather the result of poor management 
decisions such as having outdated arenas or hurting attendance by dumping players in 
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order to gain salary cap space for future seasons.81The poor economic condition of the 
league and some of its teams is forcing the league to demand large changes in the 
upcoming CBA. Commissioner Stern and the owners have already stated that they would 
like to reduce the amount of BRI devoted to player salaries from 57% to 40%, reduce the 
amount of maximum veteran and rookie contracts, and move to a hard cap. The league 
would like to reduce both the amount of years and the value for maximum rookie and 
veteran contracts. It has proposed a move from maximum contracts of six years worth 
more than $100 million to maximum contracts of four years and approximately $60 
million dollars.82The move to a hard cap would eliminate the exceptions that are now 
included in the CBA, which would drastically reduce salaries and remove the famous 
Bird rights. All of these measures will be forcefully contested by the NBPA, who will 
want to keep player salaries where they currently are and want to keep the salary cap as it 
is now. The NBPA executive Billy Hunter has recently said that there is a 99% chance 
that there will be a lockout next summer.83The players hope that revenues increase this 
year as well as TV ratings so that they can point to these improvements as proof that the 
future is bright for the league. If the players are locked out it would be the first time since 
the 1998 lockout that occurred when owners thought that players were receiving too high 
of a percentage of BRI. 
 The NFL has faced similar problems as the owners have cited hardships from the 
recent economic downturn, and an excessive amount of income going toward players 
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salaries as the reasons behind slow negotiations for a new CBA. The average NFL team 
dropped in value from $1.04 billion to $1.02 billion.84The owners want to lower salaries, 
lower the amount of revenue that is used for player salaries, and increase the amount of 
games in the NFL regular season. The players do not want to budge on demands for 
lower salaries, since they have made progress in each of the former CBAs to increase 
salaries and benefits for players. The players also believe teams might be holding back 
revenue collected from TV agreements and other operations that are not being shared 
with the players. It seems that the two sides will most likely reach an agreement even if 
there is a small lockout. The players have already softened its stance on the 18 game 
regular season if they are allowed less time in other non-game activities such as practice 
and pre-season.85 
 The MLB has not begun negotiations for its new CBA, but talks are expected to 
commence in early 2011. There is not much contention expected and talks will most 
likely go smoothly as the major issues at hand are drug testing, the expansion of the MLB 
draft and the potential of expanding the MLB playoffs.  
Going forward all the sports leagues should have relatively easy negotiations 
since most of the major issues such as free agency and salary caps have been 
implemented and have been institutionalized in their respective sports. The major 
challenges will be faced by the NBA in this year’s negotiations. The NFL and MLB look 
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to only make minimal changes to their agreements since they have been largely 
successful. The usual adjustments to player salary maximums and minimums will most 
likely change and revenue sharing will be talked about but not changed significantly.  
 Conclusion 
The real story behind collective bargaining is the relentless battles that have 
ensued over time to secure what we now take for granted as sports fans. There has been 
years of litigation, lockouts, and strikes all for the purpose of producing a product that 
brings maximum entertainment to the fans at the lowest cost to the owners while ensuring 
the happiness of the players. The whole process works for the benefit of the three entities: 
player, owner, and fan. The history’s of each sport’s collective bargaining agreement 
mirrors the economic and social climate of the United States. The society that we live in 
is based on the struggle of individuals against each other for the collective good of the 
whole. The principle mirrors the dialectic of Hegel where there is the thesis that drives us 
in a certain direction and this thesis is met with antithesis of radical thought and 
opposition and these two forces concede a synthesis that dictates our actions into the 
future until the process repeats itself. The collective bargaining process can never be 
perfect, but it will always lead to a synthesis of new and revolutionary ideas in the labor 
and sports industry.  
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